The Confederates, though badly beaten, were at last concentrated within the fortifications of Vicksburg, and availing themselves of its great advantages they were enabled to make a protracted and desperate defence. In order that the reader may have a definite understanding of this position and the difficulties that still remained for the Union army to overcome, let him imagine a plateau two hundred fifty feet above the surface of the Mississippi, originally level, or sloping off gently toward the Big Black, but now cut and seamed in all directions by ravines from eighty to a hundred feet deep, with steep sides made more difficult by a heavy growth of fallen timber, which the Confederates had cut down for the purpose of encumbering the ground and giving them fair range upon troops trying to advance over it. These ravines leading into three creeks flowing into the Mississippi, one just above Vicksburg, another within its limits, and the third entirely below it, were divided by high and difficult ridges, along which had been thrown up a series of open and closed redoubts, armed with artillery and connected by single and double lines of well-constructed rifle-trench for infantry. The entire line, including three miles of river front, was nearly eight miles in extent, for the defence of which the Confederate General had something more than twenty thousand effective men.
Grant's army was posted in the following order: Sherman's corps, composed of Steele's, Blair's, and Tuttle's divisions, held the right, extending from the ridge road around to the river; McPherson, with Logan's, Crocker's, and Quinby's divisions, held the centre on both sides of the Jackson road; while McClernand, with Carr's, A. J. Smith's, Osterhaus's, and Hovey's divisions, held the left, extending well around to the south side of the city. The ground had been reconnoitred in front of the different divisions, and although seen to be exceedingly difficult it was not regarded as impassable. Grant had been informed by his cavalry that Johnston was gathering a strong force on the east side of the Big Black with which to fall upon his rear, and knowing that Pemberton's army must still be in considerable disorder, if not actually too much demoralized to make a determined resistance, he decided upon an assault of the enemy's line.
Accordingly he issued orders for all the field-batteries to open fire upon the enemy's works at half-past one, and that at precisely two o'clock the entire army should move to the attack. These orders were promptly obeyed; the batteries poured forth an incessant fire for more than a half-hour at close range, dismounting and silencing nearly all the enemy's guns; and promptly at the time appointed the infantry sprang cheerfully forward, confident of sweeping over the works as they had done at the Big Black bridge. Steele, Blair, Logan, and Carr made fair headway, but the Confederates replied with spirit and with deadly effect. The ground was too much broken and encumbered with fallen timber and regular abattis; no order could be maintained among the troops, though every effort was made to carry them forward even in disarray; but it was impossible. The Thirteenth Regulars, Eighty-third Indiana, and One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois planted their colors on the parapet, but officers and men alike perceived their inability to do more, and suspended the attack. The National loss was considerable, with no adequate gain except a more advanced position and a better understanding of the ground in front of the works.
The failure of this attempt did not, however, cut off all hope of carrying the place without resorting to the laborious process of a siege. The troops were permitted to rest for a while; roads were opened along the lines of investment, and to the new bases of supplies at Chickasaw Landing and Warrenton; provisions and ammunition were brought forward, and everything was got in readiness for a new trial. At 6 P.M. of the 21st Grant issued orders directing that at 10 A.M. the next day a general attack should be made along the entire line and particularly on all the roads leading into Vicksburg. In pursuance of these instructions the troops moved forward at the appointed time, but, owing to the broken ground over which they were compelled to march, it was soon found to be impossible to move either in well-ordered lines or in weighty effective columns.
“For we do not have a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but we have one who has been tempted in every way, just as we are – yet was without sin.”
– Hebrews 4:15