This gave the Union line a crescent shape, only broken by the elbow-like advance of Sickles's corps (Third) down to the Emmetsburg road, along which it was drawn to a point west of Round Top, where it was refused toward that height. Thus advanced, of course he offered the true point of attack, which Lee was not long in discovering. The attack was made about 4 P.M. of the 2d, at a moment when Meade was viewing the faulty and somewhat dangerous position. He said: "When I arrived on the ground, which I did a few minutes before 4 P.M., I found that General Sickles had taken up a position very much in advance of what it had been my intention that he should take - that he had thrown forward his right flank instead of connecting with the left of General Hancock, something like a half or three-quarters of a mile in front of General Hancock, thus leaving a large gap between his right and Hancock's left; and that his left, instead of being near the Round Top Mountain, was in advance of the Round Top; and that his line, instead of being a prolongation of Hancock's line, as I expected it would be, made an angle of about 45 degrees with it. I told him that I was very fearful he would be attacked and would lose the artillery, which he had put so far in front, before I could support it, or that, if I undertook to support it, I would have to abandon all the rest of the line which I had adopted - that is, that I would have to fight the battle out there where he was. General Sickles expressed regret, and promptly said that he would withdraw his forces to the line which I had intended him to take. But I told him I was fearful that the enemy would not permit him to withdraw, and that there was no time for any further change of movement. And before I had finished that remark, the enemy's batteries opened upon him and the action began."
Referring to his order for attack, Lee said: "In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry the position, while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had been already partially fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the centre of the Federal line, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself for attack. After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would be able ultimately to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark."
After twenty minutes of rapid and effective artillery fire, Hood's division of Longstreet's command pressed upon Sickles's extreme left. Two brigades of Birney's division - De Trobriand's and Ward's - held the refused line, from the Emmetsburg pike to the base of the Round Top Mountain. The Third Brigade (Graham's) faced the road and connected with the left of Sickles's second division (Humphreys's). The attack was, indeed, a flanking movement, for, while engaging Birney's two brigades, Hood swung his right around upon the ridge on whose length Meade's main line rested.
This effort to flank Sickles was successful, and only a happy circumstance averted the great calamity of the loss of Little Round Top. Chief of Engineers Warren, ascending to the crest of Little Round Top - then used as a signal station - arrived just in time to witness the flanking movement. His ready eye comprehended all in a moment, and he hastened down the rugged declivity for aid to hold the key to the ridge. Happily he encountered the Fifth Corps advance division (Barnes's), then marching to Sickles's aid. Assuming the responsibility of detaching Vincent's brigade, with Hazlett's battery, Warren led the men up the height, while the battery was literally lifted up by human hands. Not a moment too soon, for the enemy already were mounting the western slope, which commanded the crest, when Vincent's men came up from the cast and north.
The two bodies rushed together like two athletes, Hood's Texans firing and then resorting to the bayonet, and Vincent's undaunted fellows using the bayonet or clubbed musket. Officers and men all fought like furies, and in thirty minutes the fray was ended by the appearance, on Vincent's right of Weed's brigade, of Ayres's division (Fifth Corps). What was left of the Texan regiments retired sullenly to the valley below. There, reinforced, the regiments worked their way up the rocky defile between the two Round Top hills, and suddenly appeared on Vincent's flank. Only the bayonet could dislodge Hood's dogged men, and Colonel Chamberlain put his Maine men to the charge. The enemy again were driven back, and the hill was saved. Among the killed were both General Vincent and General Weed Captain Hazlett, whose heroism was one of the marked features of that bloody contest, and Colonel O'Rourke, commanding the One Hundrcd Fortieth New York, which bad carried Hazlett's battery up the hill. The dead lay scattered all over the rough, desolate spot; in many instances Confederate and Unionist were locked in a death embrace.
“This is how we know what love is: Jesus Christ laid down his life for us. And we ought to lay down our lives for our brothers.”
– 1 John 3:16