The forces actually engaged in this celebrated battle, so decisive in its results and so important in its consequences, were probably not far from twenty-five thousand on either side; [Pollard says, "Our effective force of all arms ready for action on the field, on the eventful morning, was less than thirty thousand men." This was before the arrival of that portion of Johnston's army led to the field by Kirby Smith, or the brigade of Early - to say nothing of the reinforcements that were received during the day from the direction of Richmond. - ED] while the combatants actually on the battle-field, or so near it as to be practically at the disposal of the respective commanders, were, on either side, not far from thirty-five thousand.
But the Confederates, who were somewhat the fewer at daybreak, fought under the encouraging stimulus of a knowledge that every hour, as it passed, added to their strength; that each railroad train arriving at the junction brought fresh brigade after brigade to their support; and these, as they arrived, were hastened to that part of the field whereon their services could be most effective: while the Union men, who had been called to arms at two in the morning, and had generally thrown aside their knapsacks and haversacks to facilitate their movements, had been fourteen hours marching - some of them on the double-quick for miles - or fighting, and were utterly exhausted and faint with hunger and thirst; while not a single company had been added to their numbers. Some regiments fought badly, and had been demoralized and dispersed before the general catastrophe; but the great majority evinced a courage and devotion which, under favoring auspices, would have commanded victory. They gave way only when hope seemed dead - when the ever-increasing hosts of their foes not only outnumbered them in their front, but filled the woods on their right flank, exposing them to an enfilading fire, which they could not return with effect; and, their defeat once confessed, the confusion and panic of their flight are explained, not excused, by the fact that, owing to the long detour they had necessarily made in advancing to the attack, pursuant to the plan of battle, their line of retreat lay in part along the front of the foe, much of whose strength was actually nearer to Centerville than they were when the fortunes of the day turned against them.
The causes of this disaster, so shamefully misstated and perverted at the time, are now generally understood. No one could, at this day, repeat the misrepresentations that for the moment prevailed, without conscious, palpable guilt and ignominy The true, controlling reasons of the Federal defeat were, briefly, these:
1. The fundamental, fatal error on that side was that spirit of hesitation, of indecision, of calculated delay, of stolid obstruction, which guided all military councils, scattering their forces and paralyzing their efforts. Had any real purpose of suppressing the rebellion been cherished by General Scott, he never would have scattered the eastern forces along the line of the Potomac and Chesapeake, from Cumberland to Fort Monroe, divided into three or four distinct armies, under the command of militia officers who had never smelled burning powder unless in a squirrel-hunt. His advance across the Potomac, after being put off as long as possible, was made, as we have seen, on May 24th.
2. The flagrant disobedience and defection of General Patterson, unaccountable on any hypothesis consistent with the possession, on his part, of courage, common-sense, and loyalty.
“Jesus said to her, "I am the resurrection and the life. He who believes in me will live, even though he dies."”
– John 11:25